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BRIAN GALLE
The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the 
Limits of Constitutional Compromise
After a quiet century or so, the scope of Congress’s power “[t]o lay and 
collect taxes”1 is once again in the news.2 The taxing power was at issue when 
the Supreme Court issued a decision that President (and Chief Justice) Taft 
would later call the worst injury to the Court’s reputation ever, Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust,3 striking down the Income Tax Act of 1894.4 That 
decision was largely reversed by the 1913 enactment of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.5 Today the taxing power is one of three grounds on which the 
federal government defends the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,6 particularly the individual responsibility requirement 
(IRR)—the portion of the Act requiring each individual to purchase insurance 
or pay a penalty tax.7
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Years of Wrangling Lie Ahead for Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2010, at A24.
3. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
4. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1491 (2001).
5. See id. at 1491-92.
6. See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 19-25, 
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(No. 3:10-cv-188-HEH), available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/
U.S.+memo+in+opposition+to+Va.+motion+for+SJ.pdf. The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act can be found at Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
7. I.R.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011).
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As of this writing, two federal district courts have found that Congress 
lacks constitutional authority to enact the IRR, whether under the taxing 
power or otherwise.8 Recent commentators have also argued that the taxing 
power is inadequate to justify the IRR.9 While I have no doubt that the IRR is 
constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s power to regulate commerce, my 
comparative advantage, if any, lies in the tax field. I have covered this ground 
before,10 but I return to respond to the commentators who criticized my earlier 
effort and to the courts that have overlooked it.
In brief, my argument is that the IRR is unquestionably a tax because 
Congress repeatedly (if not universally) refers to it in that way and, in any 
event, that there is no requirement that Congress invoke the magic word “tax”
to rely on its taxing authority. Those claims make up Part I of this Essay. Parts 
II and III take up the question of how one ought to interpret constitutional 
clauses, such as those that produced the existing limits on the taxing power, 
that are obviously the product of unprincipled compromise. Part II argues that 
the IRR is not a “direct” tax subject to a burdensome apportionment 
requirement, in part because that term should be read narrowly, as the 
Founders read it. And Part III argues that even if it is “direct,” the IRR is 
exempt from apportionment by the Sixteenth Amendment’s exception for 
“income” taxes because courts should not be in the business of writing their 
own tax code.
i . is  the irr a “tax”?
First, let me make clear that the IRR is an exercise of Congress’s power 
“[t]o lay and collect taxes.” The federal district courts in Virginia and Florida,
as well as some commentators, argue that the IRR is not a tax at all, apparently 
because it is not clearly labeled as a “tax.”11 Ordinarily, Congress does not have 
8. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 
2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768.
9. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is 
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2011); Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate 
and the Taxing Power (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
2010-33, 2010) [hereinafter Jensen, The Individual Mandate].
10. Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 27 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/5/31/galle.html.
11. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786-88; Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132-41 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Barnett, supra note 9, at 610-
13; Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 9-24.
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to invoke specifically the source of authority for its enactments.12 But Randy 
Barnett and Erik Jensen both argue that courts give special deference to
exercises of the taxing power and that the source of this deference is really just 
a refusal to look behind Congress’s choice of the “tax” label.13 So, on these 
accounts, if there is no label, there is no special deference.
It takes a particularly obstinate—even hostile—reading of the IRR 
provision to find that it is not labeled a “tax.” True, the result of a failure to 
obtain insurance is in some places called a “penalty.”14 But the letter t is 
followed by the letters a and x, in that order, forty-five times in the section of 
the Tax Code setting out the insurance requirement alone.15 Those who are 
subject to the requirement to provide insurance for themselves and their 
dependents are called “taxpayers.”16 The period for which they are required to 
carry insurance is called a “taxable year.”17 The amount payable for those who 
do not acquire qualifying insurance is in part determined according to a 
“percentage of . . . the taxpayer’s household income for the taxable year.”18
“Household income,” in turn, is defined as a slight modification of “adjusted 
gross income,”19 which is not defined in the statute, but which cross-references 
an important component of the federal income tax.20
In any event, the claim that only a statute expressly labeled as a “tax” can be 
justified under the taxing power is false. In fact, since its earliest cases 
interpreting the taxing power, the Supreme Court has held that it is the effect 
of a statute as a tax, not its mere label, that controls.21 For example, confronted 
with the question of whether a federal requirement to obtain a license to 
engage in certain “immoral” activities was within Congress’s power, the Court 
12. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
13. Barnett, supra note 9, at 610-13; Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 17-24.
14. E.g., I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2011).
15. Id. § 5000A. Actually, the total is forty-eight, but in three cases it is clear that the “tax” 
adverted to is not the tax imposed under § 5000A. In a few other instances, it is unclear 
whether the phrase “taxable year” is meant to apply to a year in which the individual is
subject to a tax under § 5000A or instead to a year in which she pays federal income tax.
16. E.g., id. § 5000A(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1), (c)(2).
17. E.g., id. § 5000A(b)(3)(A), (c)(1), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(A)(ii), (c)(2)(B).
18. Id. § 5000A(c)(2)(B).
19. Id. § 5000A(c)(4)(B).
20. See id. § 62 (defining “adjusted gross income” as “gross income minus [certain] 
deductions”).
21. But see Barnett, supra note 9, at 609-10 (“Neither has the Court ever looked behind 
Congress’s inadequate assertion of its commerce power to speculate as to whether a measure 
could be justified as a tax.”).
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in 1866 easily upheld the statute in question as an exercise of the taxing 
power.22 Although the statute made no mention of a “tax,” the Court held that 
“[t]he granting of a license must be regarded as nothing more than a mere 
form of imposing a tax.”23 Later, the Court would explain that the “scope and 
effect” of a statute determined whether it could be upheld as “within a granted 
power,”24 although in that particular case it noted the inquiry was unnecessary 
because the levy was called a tax on its face.25
The Florida district court’s claim to the contrary is based on a logical 
fallacy. It states correctly that under Supreme Court precedent, if Congress 
uses the word “tax,” then the enactment is constitutionally a tax.26 To put that 
in logical terms, if A (“tax”), then B (tax). But the court then asserts that if 
Congress does not use the word “tax,” it follows that the enactment is not a 
tax27: in logical terms, if not-A, then not-B. That is a formal logical fallacy, 
known as denying the antecedent.28
The case law also deeply undercuts the suggestion by two courts that 
Congress’s decision to replace the word “tax” with “penalty” during the 
drafting of the statute demonstrates Congress’s “intent” to treat the IRR as 
something other than a tax for constitutional purposes.29 Since Congress does
not have to use magic words to rely on its taxing power, the fact that it chose 
not to use those words sheds no light on its intent. Suppose, for example, that 
by default tenants in my state can obtain attorneys’ fees if they prevail in suits
against their landlords. I have on my word processor a form lease that also 
provides for fees in that instance. I delete the fee-shifting clause, then print the 
lease and sign it. Have I waived my right to sue my landlord? If I know about 
22. The License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 474-75 (1866).
23. Id. at 471. During the pendency of the litigation, Congress amended one of the challenged 
statutes to replace the term “license” with “special tax.” The Court said this amendment 
“fully confirms, if confirmation were needed, the view . . . that the requirement of payment 
for licenses under former laws was a mere form of special taxation.” Id. at 473.
24. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904).
25. Id.
26. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1140 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
27. Id.
28. See THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 171 (Nicholas Bunnin & Jiyuan 
Yu eds., 2004) (defining “denying the antecedent”). For example, suppose we say that if 
Prince Charles is a Canadian, he is also a subject of the Queen of England. But Charles is not 
a Canadian. It does not follow that he is not a subject of the Queen.
29. Mead v. Holder, No. 10-cv-00950-GK, 2011 WL 611139, at *56-59 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); 
McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-36.
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the default rule, the answer is clearly not; all I have done is saved some printer 
toner by omitting a redundant clause. And the default rule here, since 1866, is 
that Congress does not need to use the word “tax” to rely on its constitutional 
power to tax. We have no reason to believe Congress was unaware of well-
settled precedent. All of this presumes, as well, that Congress even has the 
power to prevent courts from sustaining a statute on some constitutional 
ground, a difficult proposition some of the district courts have simply assumed 
to be true with no explanation.
Nor is there any persuasive normative case for conditioning 
constitutionality on Congress’s definitively labeling an excise as a “tax.”
Barnett and Jensen appear to suggest that the tax label will create some 
additional political constraint, perhaps on the theory that the label will increase 
the salience of the burden on the public.30 As I have argued, though, there is no 
evidence that decreasing the salience of a tax eases its passage.31 Public choice 
theory in fact implies the opposite. Few voters oppose obvious taxes because 
each free rides on the others.32 When taxes are partly hidden, though, those 
who are aware both of the tax and others’ ignorance of it increase their 
opposition because they know they cannot free ride.33
Courts have sometimes also used “clear statement rules” of the sort Barnett 
and Jensen suggest to defend federalism values.34 The IRR, though, is an 
example of exactly the kind of legislation that, in a normatively sensible 
federalist structure, should be within federal authority.35 The structure of 
30. The Constitutionality of the Affordable Healthcare Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Randy Barnett), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02%20Barnett%20Testimony.pdf; Jensen, The 
Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 16 n.75; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 
F. Supp. 2d 768, 786 (E.D. Va. 2010) (describing the term “tax” as “politically toxic”). I say 
“perhaps” because neither Jensen nor Barnett has explained why forcing Congress to say the 
magic word “tax” would be a meaningful political constraint. So perhaps my argument is a 
straw man, but it is the sturdiest straw man I could build with the materials they provide. It 
is also very similar to political arguments offered in other contexts by federalism supporters. 
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement 
Rules, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 833 (2005).
31. Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 98-100 (2009).
32. Those who pay much more than others are the obvious exception. Given the relatively trivial 
burden of the excise tax for high earners, though, the perceptions of wealthy voters are not 
really at stake in the IRR debate.
33. See Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative 
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 237-38 (2010).
34. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
35. For further development of the argument that courts should encourage, rather than resist, 
federal efforts to expand state autonomy, see Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative 
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health care produces a race to the bottom that diminishes state autonomy. The 
fact that some states provide care for the uninsured creates a cross-border 
moral hazard, allowing neighboring states to offer fewer free services but 
permitting citizens of the low-service states to cross the border when they fall 
ill.36 Offering fewer free services means that paid services are cheaper or taxes 
are lower. So the pressure on each state is to free ride on the efforts of its 
neighbors; states that offer better services attract migrants that drive up prices, 
taxes, or both. As a result, states cannot set the policy that their citizens might 
prefer. Whether this collective action problem is solved through direct federal 
legislation, conditional spending, or, as here, conditional taxation, the answer 
should be the same: federal action enhances state autonomy and so should face 
few judicial barriers.37
In addition to his clear-statement argument, Barnett also appears to argue 
that the IRR is not a tax because the “mandate cannot have been imposed to 
raise revenue.”38 His point seems to be that it is only the penalty for failing to 
follow the IRR that raises money and so the IRR itself cannot be justified 
under the taxing power. But the IRR, like any tax on a particular transaction, 
simply defines the transaction that is subject to taxation. If Barnett’s view were 
correct, then nearly all of the taxing power cases decided by the Supreme Court 
have been wrongly decided. When Congress properly imposed a tax on 
margarine colored to look like butter, the coloring of butter itself brought in no 
Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1933, 1985-90 (2008).
36. Cf. Edward Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, TAX NOTES, Aug. 16, 2010, at 755, 756 n.4 
(observing that uninsured people also travel in interstate commerce and sometimes 
consume health care in multiple states). States cannot refuse care to newcomers, because 
that would violate their constitutional obligation to treat equally citizens of every state. See 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-11 (1999).
37. See Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937) (agreeing with the 
unemployment insurance system’s defenders that federal tax penalties imposed on 
employers in states that failed to enact unemployment insurance were “not constraint[s], 
but the creation of a larger freedom” and noting that state collective action problems 
prevented widespread adoption of unemployment insurance at the state level); see also
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644-45 (1937) (upholding the Social Security retirement 
system on the grounds that interstate tax competition made state-level solutions 
impractical).
The IRR also overcomes a similar cross-border moral hazard problem for state-level 
efforts to prohibit discrimination against patients with preexisting conditions: absent a 
federal requirement, residents of states with no insurance coverage mandate could relocate 
to nondiscrimination states whenever they got sick, making nondiscrimination prohibitively 
expensive to enact. 
38. Barnett, supra note 9, at 611-12.
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funds for the Treasury.39 Transferring marijuana to someone who has not 
obtained a license raises no money for the Treasury, but taxes on such transfers 
are part of the taxing power.40
Finally, two federal district courts have mistakenly concluded that the IRR 
could be recharacterized as imposing a “penalty” and therefore falls outside of 
Congress’s power to impose a tax.41 The courts rely for this proposition on 
cases interpreting the rights of individuals subject to government 
punishment.42 It is true that Congress cannot escape the heightened due 
process standards to which criminal defendants are entitled, such as protection 
against double jeopardy, by the expedient of attempting to label a punishment 
as something else.43 But that fact does not in any way undermine other clear 
holdings of the Supreme Court that any tax that raises revenue, no matter how 
little, is within the grant of authority contained in Article I, Section 8.44
ii . is  the irr a “direct” tax?
So if the IRR and its accompanying penalty provisions are a tax scheme, are 
they a proper exercise of Congress’s taxing power? Barnett and the Virginia 
court continue to claim that they are not because otherwise there would be no 
limit on Congress’s power to regulate the economy.45 As I have explained 
before, those arguments are wrong both normatively and as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court has already rejected that identical argument in an almost 
identical context: Congress’s use of its Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 power to 
39. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904).
40. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950).
41. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 
2011 WL 285683, at *23 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d 768, 787 (E.D. Va. 2010).
42. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (citing United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931)).
43. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-79, 784 (1994).
44. E.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27-28 (1953). Another case the Virginia court 
relies on, Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 785 (citing United States v. Reorganized CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)), is even less apposite. The holding of 
CF&I turns specifically on statutory interpretive principles unique to the Bankruptcy 
Code—in particular the rule that bankruptcy determinations rest on functional effects, 
irrespective of labels. 518 U.S. at 224.
45. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (arguing that the court’s conclusion is necessary to prevent 
“unchecked expansion of congressional power”); Barnett, supra note 9, at 613-14.
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collect taxes and spend them for the general welfare.46 Further, the taxing and 
spending powers are not unlimited but rather face unique structural and judge-
made limits that at least check, if not absolutely prohibit, congressional efforts 
to use the purse as a source of endless authority.47
Let me focus here, then, on the seemingly more technical question, raised 
by Jensen and others, of whether the IRR meets the constitutional requirement 
that “direct” taxes be “apportioned.” Again, though, large questions of 
federalism arguably lurk in the background. “Direct” taxes have to be 
apportioned across states by population (including, infamously, three-fifths of 
a state’s slave population),48 which is to say that if a state has ten percent of the 
U.S. population, it would have to pay ten percent of the total federal revenues 
for that tax.
The apportionment requirement derives from negotiations at the 
Constitutional Convention over slavery. Southern states wanted slaves to count 
as persons for purposes of allocating representation in Congress; delegates 
from Northern states ultimately agreed, but only after the addition of 
compromise language providing that slaves would also increase the Southern 
burden for certain “direct” taxes by counting slaves as three-fifths of a person 
for apportionment purposes.49 Famously, no one knew what “direct” taxes 
were supposed to include,50 and historians generally think the term was just a 
way of papering over the controversy with language that had no real 
importance.51 Early authorities treat it as covering taxes on persons as such, and 
perhaps on the mere ownership of property, but no more.52
46. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-11 (1987). The Virginia court cites United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936), for the opposite proposition. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786. 
But Dole expressly rejected Butler’s claim that without judicial invalidation of spending 
legislation, the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional limits would be meaningless. 
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2, 210-11.
47. See Galle, supra note 10, at 35.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
49. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 552 (2d ed. 1970).
50. See James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, in 5 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 451 (Ayer 
Co. 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881).
51. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 180 (1996); Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes 
Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 
848-55 (2009).
52. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (summarizing the prior one hundred 
years of doctrine); Dodge, supra note 51, at 864-75.
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Jensen argues for a more expansive view of “direct,” one that might include 
many forms of income tax and perhaps the IRR, by asserting that the Founders 
would never have intended an unlimited taxing power.53 He brushes aside a 
contrary 1796 Supreme Court decision as having been authored by 
“Federalists,”54 and, more recently, he claims that the Founders could never 
have imagined an income tax and so their failure to mention income taxes as 
direct can have no interpretive significance.55 Great Britain, however, instituted 
an income tax in 1799, and that tax had antecedents going back to 1758.56 And, 
as I have just argued, in fact the taxing power is subject to a series of limits, if 
not the ones preferred by Jensen. So Jensen’s syllogism—that “direct” taxes 
must be read broadly enough to cover some income taxes because otherwise 
the Taxing Clause would be unlimited—fails in almost every respect.57
Nor is it the case that every constitutional clause must be read to embody 
some broader purpose.58 As John Manning argues, we should acknowledge 
that some provisions are simply the result of political horse trading and take 
them at their own terms.59 Manning’s controversial example is the Eleventh 
Amendment, but consider the more prosaic Article II, Section 1 requirement 
that only “a natural born citizen” can serve as President. Few would argue that 
John McCain, born in the Panama Canal Zone, was ineligible for the 
53. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes 
Unconstitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2382-83 (1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Apportionment 
of “Direct Taxes”]; Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 15, 32-33.
54. Jensen, Apportionment of “Direct Taxes,” supra note 53, at 2361.
55. Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 29.
56. See SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 57-82 (tracing development of the 1799 tax); Edward B. 
Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280, 294-95 (1907) 
(describing “[w]hat has sometimes been called the first income tax” of 1758).
57. Jensen does offer one other reason for treating “direct” taxes as including more than a 
“capitation” tax, or a tax on personhood. He claims that capitation taxes are automatically 
apportioned—they necessarily track state population exactly—or at least that 
“apportionment is a much less serious constraint for a lump-sum head tax,” such that it 
would have made no sense to require apportionment only for a head tax. Jensen, The 
Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 31-32. But that is only true if every person counts the 
same for apportionment purposes, and of course the exact reason for apportionment 
identified by every other historian is that it facilitated a compromise in which slaves would 
count as three-fifths of a person. So again Jensen’s syllogism does not follow.
58. Indeed, the early Court consistently tolerated transparent efforts to avoid the direct tax limit 
through minor changes in form. Whitney, supra note 56, at 288.
59. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 
YALE L.J. 1663, 1682-1720 (2004); see also Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1999) (arguing that the Direct Tax Clause was a political 
compromise rooted in slavery and so should be interpreted narrowly).
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presidency;60 we simply read the provision as a somewhat inexplicable, thin, 
and formal requirement, easily satisfied.
Even on Jensen’s own terms, the IRR is not a direct tax. In his earlier work, 
Jensen claimed that a “direct” tax was one that could not be “shifted” by 
avoiding the untaxed activity.61 Picking up on some language in the Federalist
papers authored by Alexander Hamilton, Jensen claimed that such shifting was 
an inherent limit on the power of government to tax because, if taxes were too 
high, they would distort behavior so much that they would collect no revenues. 
It was this limit, Jensen suggested, that made indirect taxes consistent with his 
view that the Founders would not have countenanced an unlimited tax.62
By these standards, the IRR is obviously indirect. Anyone can avoid it by 
purchasing insurance. In his recent work on the IRR, though, Jensen claims 
that it is not indirect because the individual will have to pay either the 
government or the insurance company.63 But this flatly misreads his own 
argument. The shifting point, once more, is that consumer behavior will 
constrain congressional overreaching by limiting government revenues; it has 
nothing to do with how much individuals pay each other.64 In fact, in the 
shifting described by Hamilton, consumers often shift from a taxed product, 
such as tea, to an untaxed one, such as coffee.65 Just as with the IRR, 
consumers may still be paying for something.
Perhaps Jensen would say that his new version of the shifting analysis 
prevents government not just from overtaxing but also from overregulating. 
His revised stance on direct taxes would tend to constrain Congress from 
driving people toward a particular economic outcome. If so, then he too is 
arguing that all of the taxing power cases on the books are wrong. Under this 
version of his argument, taxes on colored margarine, gambling, guns, liquor, 
and marijuana, all of which have been upheld by the Court,66 would be “direct”
60. But see Gabriel J. Chin, Commentary, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President: Eleven 
Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 3 
(2008) (suggesting that, though the provision is a “technicality,” the rule of law demands 
that it be respected).
61. Jensen, Apportionment of “Direct Taxes,” supra note 53, at 2395.
62. Id. at 2396.
63. Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 37.
64. I should note that I find the shifting analysis unpersuasive generally, because I agree with 
Dodge that in fact all taxes can be “shifted.” Dodge, supra note 51, at 862.
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27 (1953) (summarizing the Court’s holdings in 
such cases).
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because shifting cannot prevent the government from achieving its policy goal 
of deterring the activity.
iii . is  the irr an income tax?
Even if the IRR were a “direct” tax, it is still exempt from apportionment 
because it is an income tax, and the Sixteenth Amendment states that income 
taxes need not be apportioned. My view, as I have said elsewhere, is that the 
IRR is an income tax because those subject to the tax pay a percentage of their 
income, with a floor of $695 and a cap determined by the cost of obtaining 
qualifying insurance coverage.67 The floor has an additional exception that is 
itself based on income.68
Here, again, the question is how broadly to read a mysterious political 
compromise enshrined as constitutional text. Jensen and others assert that, 
when Congress proposed a constitutional amendment exempting “income” but 
not other direct taxes from apportionment, they must have intended to 
preserve some aspect of the apportionment requirement. Thus, Jensen 
interprets “income” to exclude provisions that would resemble capitation taxes 
(taxes on persons as persons), apparently on the ground that to do otherwise 
would be to permit end-runs around the dregs of apportionment.69 Therefore, 
he suggests that a tax is not an “income” tax if “it may be measured by income 
for some persons, but will not be for many others.”70 According to Jensen, 
since the IRR imposes an equal tax on all those whose taxable amount exceeds 
the cap, their tax is not “measured by income” and hence the IRR is not an 
income tax.71
Jensen admits that by his standard the Social Security tax is constitutionally 
questionable,72 but he fails to realize that under his test nearly every aspect of 
the income tax, from its inception to today, would fall as well. The income tax 
increases liability for many reasons other than income alone. It imposes higher 
taxes on those who live in the United States for the majority of each year; on 
those who pay no college tuition; on those who fail to save for retirement; on 
those who forgo compensation in the form of insurance premiums; and on 
67. See I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (Supp. IV 2011).
68. See id. § 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(2).
69. Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 38-43.
70. Id. at 40 & n.180.
71. Id. at 40-43.
72. Id. at 43.
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those who finance their homes with a loan of more than $1 million.73 In all 
cases, two taxpayers with identical incomes pay different tax. Are these 
deviations from the constitutional definition of “income,” thereby requiring 
apportionment, or are they instead merely a way of measuring income, 
properly conceived? Jensen’s test would require that courts make that decision 
for nearly every provision of the Tax Code.
Consider, too, the rate structure of the tax system. In Jensen’s view, if too 
many people with differing incomes pay the same amount, a levy is no longer 
an income tax.74 Apparently, then, Jensen’s Constitution dictates the rate 
structure that Congress must choose in enacting an income tax. If it is too flat, 
resulting in too little difference between what those of different incomes pay, 
then it must be apportioned, which is to say that it cannot practically be 
implemented. Whatever the Sixteenth Amendment was supposed to 
accomplish, the context of its enactment as a response to a prior judicial 
invalidation must at a minimum be understood to foreclose endless judicial 
nitpicking over the form of the income tax75—but that is precisely what 
Jensen’s view demands.
To be sure, the language of the Sixteenth Amendment should be read to 
have some content. Perhaps Congress was unwilling to expend the effort to 
win  passage of an amendment that simply deleted the apportionment 
requirement,76 so we should honor that choice. But there are many ways to 
give content to “income” without installing the Supreme Court as a tax super-
legislature. For example, the Supreme Court has distinguished income taxes 
from wealth taxes.77 An income tax measures accessions to, or changes in, net 
wealth, and those new accessions are taxed only once by an income tax 
system.78 A wealth tax taxes the whole value of the taxpayer’s property, and it 
73. I.R.C. §§ 25A, 25B, 106, 163, 901. Incidentally, many of these provisions are, in effect, a 
penalty on inaction. For example, § 106 imposes a higher tax on those who fail to purchase 
health insurance—exactly the incentive system that Barnett has labeled “unprecedented.” 
Barnett, supra note 9, at 606; see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 
768, 788 n.13 (E.D. Va. 2010) (claiming that the IRR would be “the only tax in U.S. history 
to be levied . . . for . . . failure to affirmatively engage in activity”). Section 106 was enacted 
in 1954. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 106, 68A Stat. 3, 32 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 106).
74. Jensen, The Individual Mandate, supra note 9, at 41-42.
75. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916).
76. See Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1114-23 (2001).
77. See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 314 (1937).
78. See id.; see also Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955).
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can do so repeatedly.79 Under this view, so long as Congress does not attempt 
to use its income tax power as a wealth tax, any income tax would be 
presumptively valid. This rule has the strong appeal that it would avoid the 
need for the Supreme Court to create its own idealized notion of incomes and 
rate structures against which any congressional efforts would have to be 
judged.
In contrast, the normative appeal of Jensen’s approach is at best circular: it 
rests on his insistence that the taxing power must have some limits. If this 
represents an argument distinct from Barnett’s lament about the size of federal 
government, it is not clear how. And, as with Barnett, the response is that there 
are limits in place. The question for Jensen is: why are those limits inadequate? 
For instance, is there some reason why the limits must be judicially 
enforceable, rather than structural?
That Jensen and his cohorts have offered no answers thus far is not to say 
that no answers could be found. But before we unleash the Court to stride 
among the tax laws and smite them down where the Court will, it would be 
nice to know what principles should guide the smiting hand. For now, the 
Direct Tax Clause, and the income tax exception from it, remain constitutional 
text in search of any obvious underlying rationale.
conclusion
Once again, the IRR is clearly constitutional under governing Supreme 
Court precedent, and normatively it should not be otherwise. The IRR solves 
major social problems, while the constitutional clauses that putatively restrain 
it serve no purpose at all except resolving long-dead political stalemates. 
Perhaps those compromises deserve to be honored, if for no other reason than 
to facilitate future compromise. But honor is fully paid by narrowly respecting 
the literal terms of the deals; critics who rely on those provisions propose 
instead some unspecified set of quasi-libertarian norms whose outcome would 
rest solely in the hands of judges.
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79. See Graves, 300 U.S. at 314.
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